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THE RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF EMPLOYEES
AGAINST INSOLVENT EMPLOYERS
MoIz RAHMAN*
RgSUMIt
Dans cet article, l'auteur 6tudie la rrcente d6cision de la Cour d'appel de
l'Ontario dans la cause Ontario (Minist~re du travail, Normes d'emploi) versus
Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (fiduciaire de). Cette d6cision donne une interprdta-
tion du droit des employrs i recevoir un avis de cessation d'emploi ou un salaire
A la place d'un avis en vertu de la Loi sur les normes d'emploi, L.R.O., 1990,
chap. E-14, articles 57 et 58. Dans cette d6cision, on maintient que les employrs
dont l'emploi a pris fin lorsque leur employeur a requ une ordonnance de
s6questre n'ont pas le droit de recevoir un avis de cessation d'emploi ou un
salaire la place d'un avis en vertu de la Loi sur les normes d'emploi. Cet article
fait la critique de cette decision et sugg~re un certain nombre de strategies pour
la contourner.
INTRODUCTION
On March 10, 1995 in a unanimous decision the Ontario Court of Appeal dealt
a further blow to employees who are unfortunate enough to lose their jobs
because their employer goes bankrupt. In the case of Ontario (Ministry of
Labour, Employment Standards) v. Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Trustee of), I the
Court of Appeal decided that employees whose employment is terminated as a result
of a receiving order being made against their employer are not entitled to termina-
tion pay or severance pay under Ontario's Employment Standards Act.2 The
Rizzo decision will have national implications for a number of reasons. It is the
first ruling by a provincial appellate court on the issue, and most provinces have
provisions similar to Ontario's in their employment law schemes. 3 Furthermore,
Copyright © 1995 Moiz Rahman. Moiz Rahman is currently a law student at Osgoode
Hall Law School. This article was written for the Intensive Program in Poverty Law at
Parkdale Community Legal Clinic for the Winter Term, 1995.
1. (1995), 22 O.R.(3d) 385 (C.A.) [hereinafter Rizzo].
2. R.S.O. 1980, c. 137 [hereinafter ESA ].
3. C. Schmitz, "Can't claim termination, severance pay from bankrupt employer, says
Ont. C.A." The Lawyers Weekly (7 April 1995).
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since the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 4 is a federal Act, courts have indicated
a desire to keep bankruptcy jurisprudence consistent across the country despite
its adjudication at the provincial level. 5 It is impossible to know exactly how
many workers will be affected by this decision, but it would appear that it would
be a significant number. In 1993 in Ontario there were 3,984 business bankrupt-
cies, the majority of which occurred in the retail and service sector6-that sector
whose employees most often rely upon minimum standards legislation.
The decision will have a direct impact on the work of the Workers' Rights Group
at Parkdale Community Legal Services (PCLS), as well as other poverty law
clinics which handle such claims. The Workers' Rights Group at PCLS has
represented employees in group claims against bankrupt employers in the past;
notable cases include Perrin Industries, and Lark Manufacturing. PCLS is
currently handling a group claim which illustrates the severity of the decision.
The claim is on behalf of nine employees against a bankrupt employer (in the
food service sector), a claim which includes claims for termination pay under
the ESA. In the case of all but one of the employees the claim is for one week's
termination pay plus 4% vacation pay-the equivalent of about $270 per
employee.
In addition to this group claim, the Workers' Rights Group handles a number of
individual claims against employers who are insolvent or otherwise financially
unstable. It is also worth mentioning that the issue of bankrupt employers was
considered so important that group expertise in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law
as it relates to casework and organizing was a goal of the Workers' Rights Group
in 1991-92. 7 Consequently, a large part of this paper will be devoted to
considering strategies for getting around the decision, and possible law reform
efforts to ensure that workers who suffer the misfortune of unemployment are
not left without minimum statutory entitlements. A discussion of the Rizzo case
will be followed by a critique of the Court of Appeal's decision, and a consid-
eration of possible strategies to circumvent the decision.
4. R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.
5. Re C.A. MacDonald & Co Ltd. (1958), 37 C.B.R. 119 cited in L. Houlden and C.
Morawetz, The Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 1993 (Toronto: Carswell,
1992) at 1.
6. Canada, Industry Canada Insolvency Bulletin, Vol. 14 No. 1, 1994.
7. G. Lebans and S. Cuthbertson, Workers' Rights Group Report 1991-1992.
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THE FACTS
On April 13, 1989 a receiving order was made against Rizzo and Rizzo Ltd., a
company which operated a chain of retail shoe stores across Canada. On April
14, the Bank of Nova Scotia, a secured creditor, appointed a receiver to manage
the property. The receiver employed a number of employees of the bankrupt
company to assist in the liquidation of the bankrupt's assets. By July, the
bankrupt's property had been liquidated and all of the stores closed. On August
23, the Ministry of Labour filed a proof of claim with the trustee in bankruptcy
on behalf of 873 employees of the bankrupt company. The total claim, for
termination, severance, and vacation pay totalled $2,600,122.93. The trustee
disallowed the claims of the employees for termination, severance, and vacation
pay on the grounds that "the bankruptcy of an employer does not constitute
dismissal from employment." '8
The Ministry of Labour appealed the trustee's decision to the Ontario Court
(General Division) and was successful in having it reversed. Farley J. held that
bankruptcy did constitute a termination of employment under the ESA, thereby
triggering the termination and severance pay provisions of the Act. In his
reasons, Farley J. argued, inter alia, that as remedial legislation, the ESA should
receive a large and liberal interpretation to ensure that its object is attained 9 (the
reasons of Farley J. will be discussed in more detail below). The trustee appealed
the General Division decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
The reasoning upon which the Court of Appeal's decision is based is quite
simple. The court looked to the wording of the relevant sections of the ESA, and
the past jurisprudence which interpreted those sections. The provisions of the
ESA considered by the Court of Appeal were ss. 40 and 40a (now ss. 57 and 58
of R.S.O. 1990, c. E-14 respectively). Those sections read as follows:
40. (1) No employer shall terminate the employment of an employee who has
been employed for three months or more unless he gives [appropriate period of
notice].
40a. (1) Where,
(a) fifty or more employees have their employment terminated by an employer
in a period of six months or less; and
(b) the terminations are caused by the permanent discontinuance of all or part of
the business of the employer at an establishment,
the employer shall pay severance pay to each employee ...
8. Re Rizzo and Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (1991), 6 O.R.(3d) 441 at 446, 11 C.B.R. (3d) 246 (Gen.
Div.) [hereinafter Rizzo (Gen. Div.) cited to O.R.].
9. Ibid at 451.
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The court held that the wording of the termination and severance pay sections
clearly indicate that "termination pay and severance pay are payable only when
the employer terminates the employment."' 10
The court then considered past jurisprudence on the issue to determine whether
or not a bankruptcy constitutes termination "by the employer." All but one of
the decisions considered by the court supported their final conclusion that
disentitled the employees to termination and severance pay. Two of the cases,
Re Malone Lynch Securities 1I and Re Kemp Products12 dealt with the same issue
as Rizzo and both disallowed claims on the grounds that the termination and
severance pay provisions of the ESA did not apply to bankrupt employers
because the claimants' employment had not been terminated by their employer
but by a receiving order. In Kemp Products, a distinction was drawn between
bankruptcy at the instance of an employer's creditor, and a voluntary assignment
in bankruptcy. The court implied that although termination pay was not
owing in the former case, "it might be otherwise if the bankruptcy had
resulted from an assignment in bankruptcy at the instance of the company."' 13
The Court of Appeal in Rizzo chose not to comment on this distinction since
the case before them did not involve a voluntary assignment. 14 The highest
decision considered in Rizzo, Mills-Hughes v. Raynor, 15 dealt with a different
issue; however, the court said in obiter that Malone Lynch was correctly
decided, and that there was no entitlement to termination or severance pay upon
bankruptcy. 16
Finally, the court considered at length the case of Re Royal Dressed Meats17
whose reasoning runs contrary to the above-mentioned jurisprudence. Like
Mills-Hughes, Royal Dressed Meats is not directly on point, and the Court of
Appeal emphasized this fact in order to dismiss its contrary analysis as obiter.
In Royal Dressed Meats, the obligation for termination and severance pay arose
prior to bankruptcy, since the employees were terminated prior to and not as a
10. Rizzo, supra, note 1 at 391.
11. [1972] 3 O.R. 725, 17 C.B.R. 86 (S.C) [hereinafter Malone Lynch cited to O.R.].
12. (1978), 27 C.B.R. 1 (Ont. S.C.) [hereinafter Kemp Products].
13. Re Kemp, supra, note 12 at 4 and Rizzo, supra, note I at 392.
14. Rizzo, supra, note 1 at 392.
15. (1988), 63 O.R. (2d) 343, 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 179 (C.A.) [hereinafter Mills-Hughes cited
to O.R.].
16. Mills-Hughes, supra, note 15 at 349, Rizzo, supra, note 1 at 395.
17. (1989), 70 O.R.(2d) 455, 76 C.B.R. (N.S.) 86 (S.C.) [hereinafter Royal Dressed Meats
cited to O.R.].
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result of the bankruptcy. The court in Rizzo approved of this reasoning. However,
in Royal Dressed Meats, Saunders J. took the liberty of discussing at length
whether there would have been entitlement to termination and severance pay
had the employees been terminated as a result of the bankruptcy. Interestingly,
Saunders J. dismissed the remarks of the Court of Appeal in Mills-Hughes as
obiter since the court in that case was not considering a claim in bankruptcy.
Saunders J. concluded that based on a transitional provision placed in the ESA
which specifically excluded its application to bankrupt employers, the Ontario
legislature had intended for the provision dealing with severance pay to apply
to employees who were terminated as a result of the bankruptcy. In dismissing
this reasoning, Austin J.A. commented that "it is neither necessary nor appro-
priate here to determine the intention of the Legislature in enacting the provi-
sional subsection." According to Austin J.A. "the intention of the legislature, as
evidenced by the introductory words of ss. 40 and 40a ... was not altered in any
way by the enactment of the provisional section." 18 Thus, based on the past
jurisprudence, and the clear wording of the Act, the court held that the issuance
of a receiving order did not trigger the termination and severance pay provisions
of the ESA.
Although the Rizzo decision appears to disentitle employees from claiming
termination and severance pay from their bankrupt employers, it is not clear
whether the decision puts an end to such claims entirely. The main question that
remains unanswered is whether the termination and severance provisions are
triggered when it is the employer who files an assignment in bankruptcy.
Because the Court of Appeal chose to bring up this issue but not answer it, the
issue remains unsettled. In fact by not answering the question after bringing it
up, the court has created more confusion around the issue. On the one hand it
could be argued that by adopting the holding of Kemp Products, the court in
Rizzo gave tacit approval to the distinction made in Kemp Products between an
involuntary and a voluntary bankruptcy. On the other hand, it is arguable that,
since the court did not feel the need to address the issue and make a distinction,
the result in the case of a voluntary assignment would be the same. Either way,
by not clearly answering the very question which it raised, the court has left
open an opportunity for claims to be made by employees in cases of voluntary
assignments.
It is also not clear whether the decision should be narrowly construed so as to
apply only to claims made under the ESA, or whether it would apply to claims
for reasonable notice (termination pay) under the common law. The decision
turns on the actual language of the Act. The court emphasized that it was the
18. Rizzo, supra, note 1 at 394.
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introductory words of the termination and severance pay provisions which
disallowed the employees' claims. Thus, it is unclear whether an employee could
file a proof of claim for termination pay arguing he or she is owed damages for
breach of the employment contract. In a regular common law action for breach
of contract an employer would only be relieved of the duty to pay such damages
if it could argued that the employment contract was frustrated. However, based
on the narrow application of the frustration doctrine, it is unlikely such a defence
would succeed (the doctrine of frustration will be given detailed consideration
below). In any case, since the Rizzo decision does not address this issue, it leaves
this question unanswered as well.
The Rizzo decision also has the effect of shutting out employees from the
government's Employee Wage Protection Program. Even though one of the
purposes of the program is to compensate employees whose employers are
insolvent or bankrupt, 19 the decision will mean that employees are no longer
entitled to receive compensation from the Program. Subsection 58.9 (1) of the
ESA clearly states that an employee "may be compensated when wages are due
and owing and the Program Administrator has verified that the wages are owing
and their amount." Since employees of a bankrupt are no longer owed termina-
tion and severance pay, it follows that they are not entitled to benefit from the
very program intended to protect them.
CRITICISM
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Rizzo is flawed in a number of ways. Not
only did the court leave a number of the issues mentioned above unsettled, the
court ignored a number of valid points raised in the General Division decision
below,20 as well as ignoring fundamental (and common sense) principles of
statutory interpretation.
The principal mistake made by the Court of Appeal in Rizzo was its decision to
look to the statute rather than the common law for the definition of termination.
Upon termination of an employment contract, an employee is entitled to dam-
ages for reasonable notice also known as termination pay. The ESA, being
minimum standards legislation, has a section on termination pay in order to
specify the minimum quantum of damages available. Thus, if one is able to
successfully sue an employer for wrongful dismissal under the common law,
one would be entitled to damages which are no less than the amount prescribed
by the Act. There is no definition of termination in the statute. Section 57 of the
19. S. 58.4(l)(a) makes employees of insolvent employers eligible if they have filed a proof
of claim, and that claim has not been paid.
20. Rizzo (Gen. Div.), supra, note 8.
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Act is not intended to provide a definition of termination. There is another
subsection, s. 57(10), which indicates those circumstances in which an individ-
ual would not be entitled to termination pay under s. 57. These grounds are
essentially the same as those grounds which would exculpate an employer from
liability for damages under the common law. It would seem only logical that the
court should look to the broader principles of contract law rather than four words
in the Act to determine whether or not there has been a termination.
Furthermore, since the ESA specifically states that it does not suspend any
remedies available at common law, 2 1 it follows that, being minimum standards
legislation, one should at least have as many rights under the ESA as under the
common law. Under the common law, there is clearly a breach of the employ-
ment contract (barring, of course the application of the doctrine of frustration
to be discussed in detail below), and therefore entitlement to reasonable notice
or damages. Therefore, the court's strict interpretation of the words "terminated
by the employer" leads to the absurd result of an employee having more rights
under the common law than under the remedial legislation which is intended to
rectify defects in and supplement the common law.
Aside from the court's failure to look to the common law, and the absurd result
flowing therefrom, the court ignored some basic principles of statutory inter-
pretation when it considered those four important words-"terminated by the
employer." The reasons of Farley J. in the decision below illustrate the short-
coming of the appellate decision in the case.
The principal interpretive mistake made by the Court of Appeal was its failure
to construe the provision according to the broader goal of the Act. As Farley J.
said in the original judgment:
"[s]ince the object and intent of the ESA is to provide minimum employ-
ment standards to benefit and protect the interests of employees and .is
therefore remedial in nature, it should receive such fair, large and liberal in-
terpretation as is necessary to ensure that its object is attained according to
its true meaning spirit and intent."'22
Farley J. went on to point out that basing entitlement merely on the timing of
termination would be "an arbitrary and unfair result that would defeat the
intended working of the ESA." 23
21. ESA, supra note 2 s. 6.
22. Rizzo (Gen. Div.), supra, note 8 at 451.
23. Ibid. at 451-2.
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Farley J. also pointed to the transitional provision which the Court of Appeal
dismissed as being unimportant. He reasoned that the transitional provision
would not be necessary had it not been meant to apply to bankrupt employers,
and that its existence would appear "to eliminate any question of the bankruptcy
not being treated as something which affected the employment relationship. '24
It is unclear why the Court of Appeal did not believe that this apparent
manifestation of legislative intent was important.
The Court of Appeal also erred by its own interpretation of s. 40 and 40a of the
ESA. The Court held that the bankruptcy was not a termination by the employer.
However, even in the case of an involuntary bankruptcy, the bankrupt must do
something-an act of bankruptcy-in order for a creditor to be able to success-
fully petition a court to issue a receiving order. A company or individual may
be petitioned into bankruptcy by its creditors if it is insolvent, and commits one
of ten acts listed as acts of bankruptcy under s. 42 of the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act.2 5 An act of bankruptcy includes leaving the country or otherwise
absenting oneself with intent to defeat one's creditors;26 a fraudulent convey-
ance under the Act;27 defaulting on a proposal made under theAct. 28 In all cases,
it is the bankrupt who commits an act. Although an act of bankruptcy may not
be the desire of the bankrupt, and may be avoided at all costs, it is nevertheless
an act by the bankrupt. Indeed, in an unrelated case (to be discussed further
below) the Ontario High Court held that the carrying on of one's business affairs
so as to necessitate the appointment of a receiver was intentional enough to
invoke the actively worded successor employer provision of the Labour Rela-
tions Act. 29 Thus, it would be open to a court to interpret any of these acts, rather
than the piece of paper that is the receiving order, as supplying the necessary
volition on the part of the employer to trigger both the termination and severance
pay provisions of the ESA.
One of the biggest problems with the Rizzo decision is linked to this aspect of
volition and the active nature of dismissal insisted upon by the courts to trigger
the ESA. The court, by refusing to address the question brought up by Kemp
Products, has left this area of the law unsettled. In the absence of any direction
24. Ibid. at 453.
25. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 s.43(1) [hereinafter Bankruptcy
Act]. Note that an insolvent person is defined in s. 2 of the Act.
26. Ibid. subsection 42(1)(d).
27. Ibid. paragraph 42(1)(b).
28. Ibid. paragraph 42(1)(i)
29. Infra, note 65.
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by the court, the only statement on this issue is that in Kemp Products, as well
as some obiter from an Alberta Court of Queen's Bench case which mentioned
in passing that such a distinction is arbitrary and that a bankruptcy should mean
no entitlement regardless of who initiates it.30 The Court of Appeal, however,
gave no opinion regarding the direction it would lean on the issue. Ironically
this sloppy decision making on the part of the court may actually end up helping
claimant employees in a future case since the court has left this opening in the
law. It is open to employees whose employer has initiated bankruptcy to file
proofs of claim and litigate the issue. In fact, the group termination claim now
being handled by Parkdale involves such a voluntary assignment by the em-
ployer. For now at least, the Ministry of Labour seems to be drawing a distinction
and views a voluntary assignment as being favourable to employees. 3 1
STRATEGIES TO AVOID RIZZO
Although the Rizzo case will remain the law in Ontario with respect to entitle-
ment to termination and severance pay, there are a number of strategies that
claimants can adopt to get around its strict interpretation of the law. Some of the
strategies involve construing the judgment as narrowly as it construes the ESA.
Others operate within the broad interpretation of the decision in an attempt to
creatively work within the constraints imposed by the Court of Appeal. For the
purposes of my discussion, I will divide the discussion into claims made under
the ESA, the language of which the decision hinged upon, and claims under the
common law, based on the assumption that the decision, being an interpretation of
the ESA, does not apply to the common law. Because there is a good chance that
Parkdale Community Legal Services will represent clients of a bankrupt employer
in the future, it is important to consider strategies to get around the decision, since
judicial and legislative change are neither certain nor swift. Even if Parkdale does
not act in another case involving a bankrupt employer, a number of these strategies
should prove useful in the group claim which the clinic is currently handling.
Claims Under the Employment Standards Act
Perhaps the best strategy to get around Rizzo is to take advantage of the opening
left by the Court of Appeal regarding the issue of who initiated the bankruptcy.
As mentioned above, by not addressing the issue, the court left open the
possibility that a distinction should be made between the claims. It could be
30. Tkachykv. Delton Co-operative Assn. Ltd. (Trustee of) (1994), 25 C.B.R. (3d) 14 (Alta.
Q.B.).
31. This information is based on the communication that the student caseworker in charge
of the claim has had with the Ministry. Thus it is not clear that this is the official posi-
tion of the Ministry.
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argued that because the court followed the holding of Kemp Products (and did
not reject the obiter from that case which raised this issue) it tacitly gave
approval to the reasoning contained therein. However, some obiter from an old
Ontario Supreme Court case, or lack of comment by the Court of Appeal on its
own does not lend much support for the proposition. It is, therefore, important
to present a strong persuasive argument in favour of the proposition. Thus, it
could be argued that unlike the issuance of a receiving order, a voluntary assignment
in bankruptcy is clearly an active, volitional act of an employer allowing it to fall
within the termination and severance pay provisions. Furthermore, the employer is
aware ahead of time that the employment relationship will terminate as a result of
the voluntary assignment. Also, because it is the employer who initiates the
bankruptcy, it would be open for the employer to terminate the employees prior to
filing the assignment. The unfairness of the situation elucidated by Farley J. is even
more evident when an employer would be able to make a simple choice which
would give its employees access to termination and severance pay. The employer
would have nothing to lose by doing so especially if it does not have enough assets
to satisfy the claims. The employees would be able to collect from the Employee
Wage Protection Program. 32 As mentioned above, based on Parkdale's communi-
cation with the Ministry of Labour regarding the group claim, it seems the
Employment Practices Branch is sympathetic to this approach. 33
Another approach is to operate within the judgment. Rather than concentrating
on the type of bankruptcy, a claimant may have more chance of success if he or
she tries to argue that he or she was terminated before the bankruptcy rather than
by the bankruptcy. Companies on the verge of bankruptcy are often quite
financially unstable prior to actually being declared bankrupt. They may go into
receivership (to be discussed below), or they may continue to operate by barely
making payments or somehow stalling creditors from taking over. When a
company is financially unstable, the company will make sure that the creditors
who will receive their due first will be the secured creditors-the ones who have
the legal power to take over the business if the company defaults. It is the
unsecured creditors who lack the leverage of the secured creditors who will be
paid last. Of the unsecured creditors, it is the employees who are likely to remain
unpaid. Indeed, in the group claim now being handled by Parkdale, this is
precisely the case. 34 The employees went without pay for approximately one
32. This would probably happen in most cases anyway given the low priority assigned to
termination and severance pay in the settling of the bankrupt's estate; they are unse-
cured, unpreferred claims.
33. Supra, note 31.
34. It was the case in past cases handled by the clinic as well: Lark Manufacturing and Per-
fin Industries.
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month prior to the assignment in bankruptcy of their employer. In such cases,
employees may be successful in arguing that the non-payment of wages by their
employer amounted to a fundamental breach of their employment contract thus
constituting constructive dismissal from their employment. As a result they
would be entitled to termination pay since their employment was effectively
terminated prior to the bankruptcy of their employer.
An employee can claim that he or she has been constructively dismissed from
employment when the employer unilaterally changes a fundamental term of the
employment contract, and the employee chooses to treat this change as dis-
missal. Since payment of wages and the timing of such payment is a fundamental
term of an employment contract it is not surprising that non-payment of wages
has been held to be a breach of contract giving rise to constructive dismissal.
Clearly the longer an employee is not paid, the more chance of succeeding with
such an argument. One missed pay period may not be sufficient, although a court
may be inclined to decide so where the employee is otherwise going to be denied
termination pay because of Rizzo's emphasis on the timing of termination. The
only thing that may foil a contention of constructive dismissal is the possibility
that, by staying on after the unilateral change of employment, the employee may
be deemed to have condoned the change.
Generally, an employee must leave and not accept the change if an argument of
constructive dismissal is to succeed. 35 If an employee stays on, it will be
assumed that she has accepted the change and there will be a new contract which
included the unilateral change. 36 However, in such a case there are two ways to
defend against a charge of condonation. Firstly, an employee cannot condone a
change that she has no knowledge of. Thus, if the employee is promised that she
will eventually see a paycheque, she cannot be deemed to have condoned total
non-payment. 37 Secondly, even if the employee offers no protest, it could be argued
that, by staying on in employment, she was mitigating her damages. That is to say,
she was staying on hoping to be paid instead of treating the non-payment as
termination and leaving for the unemployment line. This mitigation argument is
likely to succeed given the strong duty to mitigate imposed by courts in these tough
economic times.38
The foregoing strategies suffer from the same problem. Both are contingent
upon the existence of a circumstance beyond the control of the claimant. If an
35. E. Mole, Wrongful Dismissal Practice Manual (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992) at para. 3.98.
36. Ibid.
37. Mole, supra, note 35 at 3.105.
38. SeeMifsudv. MacMillan Bathurst Inc. (1989), 70 0.R.(2d) 701 (C.A.).
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employer faithfully pays employees up to the date of a creditor initiated
bankruptcy, the above arguments would not be successful. Thus, it is important
to have other strategies ready in case the proper conditions do not exist.
Alternatives are also useful since there is no certainty that the arguments would
succeed even if the circumstances existed.
Claims Under the Common Law
A better strategy may be to avoid the ruling altogether by claiming termination
pay under the common law as pay in lieu of notice (contractual damages). It is
important to state at the outset that a claim under the common law can only be
for termination pay and not severance pay. Severance pay has no common law
equivalent and was intended to supplement regular termination pay in certain
circumstances. Although one cannot be certain that the Rizzo decision might not
also equally apply to a breach of contract under the common law, there are some
strong arguments against its application to a claim under the common law. The
most obvious is that the decision centres on the language of the ESA. The court
gave no consideration to the question of whether a bankruptcy causes a unilateral
repudiation of the employment contract. In fact, two of the cases cited by the
court in Rizzo implicitly support the proposition that such a claim would be
successful. Indeed, under contract law, an individual need not commit such a
wilful and deliberate act as that required by the Rizzo decision to be held liable
for breach of contract. The only thing that can save a promisor is the doctrine
of frustration. As will be discussed below, the doctrine of frustration will
probably not apply to bankruptcy.
In order to use the doctrine of frustration as a defence to an action for breach of
contract, it is necessary to prove that the frustrating event must be unforseen, or
have occurred through no fault of either party. Also, a party cannot argue
frustration if the party induced the frustration itself. Courts are loath to apply
the frustration doctrine even in cases where contracts contain specific force
majeure clauses meant to exempt the promisor from bearing the risk of non-per-
formance. 39 In the case of bankruptcy, the event is neither unforseen, nor is it
not the fault of the employer.
There is authority from the United States Supreme Court as far back as 1916
which held that bankruptcy does not serve to frustrate a contract. In the case of
Chicago Auditorium Association v. Central Trust Company of Illinois,40 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that bankruptcy "whether voluntary or involuntary .. [is]
39. See Atlantic Paper Stock Ltd. v. St. Anne-Nackawic Pulp & Paper Co., [1976] 1 S.C.R.
580, 56 D.L.R. (3d) 409.
40. 36 S. Ct. 412 (1916) [hereinafter Chicago Auditorium].
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the equivalent of an anticipatory breach [of the contract] (emphasis added). '4 1
The most important part of the judgment for our purposes is the reasoning used
by the court to arrive at this conclusion. The court said:
In short, it must be an implied term of every contract that the promisor will
not permit himself through insolvency or acts of bankruptcy, to be disabled
from making performance; and in this view, bankruptcy proceedings are but
the natural and legal consequence of something done or omitted to be done
by the bankrupt in violation of his engagement.42
This reasoning not only operates against the application of the frustration
doctrine, it supports the theory that bankruptcy is the fault of the employer, and
an act of the employer.
There is no Canadian jurisprudence on the issue of bankruptcy and the doctrine of
frustration. However, there is obiter from a judgment of the Supreme Court of
Canada which would support the American view of this issue. In the case of Barrette
v. Crabtree Estate,43 the Supreme Court considered the rationale for a provision of
the Canada Business Corporation Act 44 which held directors personally liable for
wages of employees. The court quoted several authorities, among them a 1904
case from Quebec whose reasoning echoes that of ChicagoAuditorium. The case
said the following regarding directors' personal liability:
The directors have personally this knowledge or should have it, and if,
aware of the company's embarrassed affairs, and specially of the danger of
the speedy collapse and insolvency, they continue to utilize the services of
employees who have no means of securing this knowledge and who give
their time and labour upon their sole reliance, often, on the good faith and
respectability of the company's directors, it is not inequitable that such di-
rectors should be personally liable, within reasonable limits, for arrears of
wages, thus given to their service. 45
Since the application of the frustration doctrine is based on the policy of
appropriate risk allocation, it only seems logical to place the risk of non-perfor-
mance on the company. Since employers are in a much better position than the
employees to bear such risk, it would seem illogical to apply the frustration
doctrine in the case of bankruptcy.
41. Ibid. at 415.
42. Ibid.
43. (1993), 101 D.L.R.(4th) 66 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter Barrette].
44. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 119(1).
45. Fee v. Turner (1904), 13 Que. K.B. 435 cited in Barrette, supra, note 43 at 76.
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Furthermore, two cases which the Court of Appeal used as authorities to deny
the employees in Rizzo entitlement under the ESA support the possibility of a
common law claim. In Kemp Products, the court considered a claim for a
severance allowance under what the applicant argued was a contract. Unfortu-
nately for the applicant, the contract contained the same language as the ESA
with respect to entitlement for the allowance. The court held that there was no
contract, and alternatively that if there was a contract the wording included
therein meant there was no entitlement upon bankruptcy. However, the court
held that if its conclusion was wrong and there was indeed a contract and its
language did not disallow the allowance, the applicant would have been entitled
to the allowance. 46 In other words, the contract would not have been frustrated
and there would be entitlement to an allowance under it.
In Malone Lynch, the court, in denying the claimant entitlement to termination
and severance pay under the ESA said the following:
In the present case, apart from the provisions of the Employment Standards
Act, there is no right to damages for termination of employment. The claim-
ant was employed by the trustee for a considerable period of time im-
mediately upon the bankruptcy occurring so that he suffered no damages by
reason of insolvency (emphasis added). 47
The implication of this statement is that had the claimant suffered damages-
had he not been employed after termination-he would have been able to
recover damages for wrongful dismissal. Both Kemp Products and Malone
Lynch seem to reinforce the contention that there is no frustration upon bank-
ruptcy, and that there is a right to claim damages for breach of contract.
More Radical Strategies
Since there is never any certainty that an employee will be able to recover from
a bankrupt estate, it is important to have alternative strategies aside from filing
proofs of claim. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the Employee Wage Protection
Program will exist in the future. Because the money for the program comes from
consolidated revenue, there is no guarantee that it will not be subject to the same cuts
that other equally important social compensation systems are being subject to.
Lifting the Corporate Veil
A much more radical solution than those mentioned above involves asking
courts to lift the corporate veil and allow employees the right to hold directors
46. Kemp Products, supra, note 12 at 4.
47. Malone Lynch, supra, note 11 at 727.
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of the corporate employer personally liable. There are two possible ways of
making directors personally liable for termination pay. The first is to use the
more conventional action of lifting the corporate veil in accordance with
accepted common law principles. The second, more drastic, solution is to go
after the directors for committing the tort of negligence. Both solutions, partic-
ularly the latter, are not likely to succeed since they are quite radical. However,
there is support for both strategies in the common law thereby making them
candidates for consideration.
Courts detest looking behind the corporate entity, even when it may be quite
logical to do so. Ever since the pronouncement of separate corporate identity in
the landmark case of Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co.,48 the directing minds of
companies have been able to retreat behind the corporate veil to avoid personal
liability. There is no authoritative case law on when it is appropriate to lift the
corporate veil. The issue was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Kosmopoulos v. Constitution Life Assurance Co.4 9 In Kosmopoulos, Wilson J.
held that the court would lift the corporate veil in cases where it would "yield a
result too flagrantly opposed to justice, convenience or the interests of Reve-
nue" 50 and that "if the veil is to be lifted at all that should only be done in the
interests of third parties who would otherwise suffer as a result of that choice. '5 1
Employees are certainly third parties, and the Supreme Court itself in Barrette
has endorsed some compelling reasons why it is in the interests of justice to lift
the corporate veil. However, since the Supreme Court decided in Barrette that
the provision of the CBCA 52 which made directors personally liable for wages
did not make them liable for termination pay, it is important to first consider
whether the existence of these statutory provisions may act as a bar to recovering
from directors under the common law.
The Supreme Court decided in Barrette that employees do not have the right to
recover termination or severance pay from directors personally under s. 119(1)
CBCA. In denying entitlement to the employees, the court held that the words
48. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.).
49. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2, 34 D.L.R.(4th) 208 [hereinafter Kosmopoulos cited to D.L.R.].
50. Ibid. at 214.
51. Ibid.
52. Subsection 119(1) reads as follows:
Directors of a corporation are jointly and severally liable to employees of
the corporation for all debts not exceeding six months wages payable
to each such employee for services performed for the corporation while
they are such directors respectively.
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"debts ... for services performed for the corporation" in s. 119(1) did not
encompass termination or severance pay since such amounts are damages for
breach of contract and not for "services performed. '53 The court was hesitant
to extend personal liability further where it was not the explicit intent of
Parliament to do so.54 The question that arises next is whether the provision of
the statute, and the strict judicial interpretation given to the statute, precludes
employees from attempting to hold directors liable for owed termination pay
under the common law. The short answer is no. There is nothing in the language
of the section that would preclude further liability on the part of directors under
the common law. The section only says that directors are liable; it does not say
that directors are personally liable only for debts for services performed. Further,
the Barrette decision should not prejudice a common law action since, like
Rizzo, it is based on the precise wording of the statute.
Indeed, the obiter from Barrette goes a long way in buttressing the case for
director liability for termination pay under the common law. As mentioned
above in the discussion of the frustration doctrine, the Supreme Court seems to
have endorsed the rationale behind holding directors personally liable for one
type of debt under the CBCA. The entire decision turned on the wording of the
provision. If the existence of the provision does not bar a common law action,
the obiter from Barrette could go a long way in convincing a court that lifting
the corporate veil would serve the interests of justice. Aside from the obiter
discussed earlier in this paper, there is yet another authority which may provide
compelling reasons to lift the corporate veil. In Barrette, the court quoted the
following from now Justice Iacobucci's book:
[lifting the veil] can be justified on the grounds that directors who authorize
or acquiesce in the continued employment of workers when the corporation is
not in a position to pay them should not be able to shift the loss onto the shoul-
ders of the employees. Other creditors who supply goods and services to the
failing corporation are not entitled to this kind of preference, but neither are
they as dependent on the corporation as employees, nor as vulnerable.55
This reasoning, added to the fact that employees have been barred from collect-
ing elsewhere (if other strategies prove unsuccessful, or where the assets of the
company could not satisfy the money owed to the employees) might help
convince a court that it is in the interests of justice to lift the corporate veil.
53. Barrette, supra, note 43 at 81.
54. Ibid.
55. F. lacobucci, M. Pilkington, and J. R. Prichard, Canada Business Corporations
(Agincourt, Ont.: Canada Law Book, 1977) cited in Barrette, supra, note 43 at 77.
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A more novel approach towards lifting the corporate veil may come in the way
of an action against the directors for negligence. There is authority from the
Ontario Court of Appeal to support the proposition that directors of corporations
owe a duty of care to employees. In the case Berger v. Willowdale A.M. C.56 the
court held that an action for negligence did lie against the director of the
company even where the employee was barred by the Workers Compensation
Act from proceeding against the corporate employer. Cory J.A. held that there
was no reason why the duty of care of the corporate employer and the duty of
care owed by the director to the employee could not co-exist. 57 Cory J.A.
stressed the personal knowledge of the director over the situation which gave
rise to the cause of action. 5 8 If one combines the aforementioned reasoning from
Barrette with the holding from Berger it would appear that an employee would
be entitled to claim damages in negligence in the case of bankruptcy of their
employer. Such an action might actually be strengthened by the Rizzo decision
particularly if the directors of the company know that if they do not terminate
their employees prior to the bankruptcy they will not be entitled to have a claim
against the estate.
Receivership
Bankruptcy is not the only cause for concern for an employee. An equally
problematic situation may occur for employees when their employer is forced
into receivership. Although technically a business could go on functioning after
a receiver recovers whatever was owed by the business, in reality once a receiver
takes over, the business will probably never exist again.59 In the event of
receivership, employees may have a remedy not available against a bankrupt
employer. There is the possibility that an employee may be able to hold the
receiver personally liable 60 for termination and severance pay under the succes-
sor employer provisions of the ESA. 6 1 Sub-section 13(2) of the ESA states:
56. (1983), 41 O.R.(2d) 89, 145 D.L.R.(3d) 247 (C.A.), leave to appeal refused, 41
O.R.(2d) 89n.
57. Ibid. at 98.
58. Ibid.
59. F. Bennett, Bennett on Creditors' and Debtors' Rights and Remedies, (Toronto: Car-
swell, 1994) at 465.
60. Personal liability in such a case means that the receiver would use money acquired from
a sale of the assets of the business or from profits made from the operation of the busi-
ness. The money is considered the costs of its administration of the business which is
satisfied prior to paying secured and unsecured creditors.
61. ESA, supra, note 2 s. 13.
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Where an employer sells a business to a purchaser who employs an em-
ployee of the employer, the employment of the employee shall not be termi-
nated by the sale, and the period of employment of the employee with the
employer shall be deemed to have been employment with the purchaser for
the purposes of Parts VII, VIII, XI, and XIV.62
Subsection 13(1) indicates that the term "sells" "includes leases, transfers, or
disposes of in any other manner." Although bankruptcy trustees have been held
not to be successor employers, 63 there is case law that supports the proposition
that receivers are successor employers. However, the ability of employees to
collect under this provision will depend a great deal on the type of receiver which
takes over the business, and on what the receiver does after taking control of the
business. A brief explanation of the law of receiverships will be followed by a
survey of the case law regarding employees' rights in the event of receivership.
There are two types of receivers, privately appointed, and court-appointed. If a
business defaults on payments to its secured creditor, the secured creditor may
appoint a receiver pursuant to the terms of the security instrument, or the creditor
may sue the business for the debt and ask the court to appoint a receiver to
preserve the assets of the business pending a judgment. The distinction between
the two types of receivers is important, since each type of receiver acts in a
different capacity. The privately appointed receiver is an agent of the secured
creditor, while the court appointed receiver is an officer of the court and is "a
principal with respect to employees and contractual obligations of the debtor. ' '64
No court or tribunal has held a privately appointed receiver to be a successor
employer, since such receivers act only to collect the debt owed to the creditor
which appointed them.
It is important to mention at the outset that the decisions which have held
receivers to be successor employers have been based on the successor employer
provisions of provincial Labour Relations Acts rather than Employment Stan-
dards legislation. However, based on the language of the ESA-which is almost
identical to that of the Ontario Labour Relations Act 6 5-and the reasoning of
62. Ibid.
63. Re Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (August 15, 1990), (Ont. S.C.) [unreported]. This case arose out of
the same bankruptcy as the one which is the subject of this paper.
64. Bennett, supra, note 59 at 458.
65. R.S.O. 1990, c. L.2, s. 64. Subsection 64(1) says the following:
"sells" includes leases, transfers and any other manner of disposition.
"successor employer" means an employer to whom the predecessor
employer sells the business
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the judgments, there is no reason why the decisions would not support such a
finding under the ESA as well.
The first such decision was that of the B.C. Labour Relations Board in Uncle
Ben's Industries Ltd. v. Canadian Union of United Brewery, Flour, Soft Drink
and Distillery Workers66 where the Board held that the appointment of a receiver
by a court was a disposition under the provisions of the B.C. Labour Relations
Act.6 7 The Board did, however, draw a distinction between a receiver which
merely liquidated the assets of the debtor, and one who carried on the business
of the debtor; the Board held that only in the latter case would the receiver incur
liability.6 8 The decision in Uncle Ben's was approved by the Ontario High Court
in Maritime Life Assurance Co. v. Chateau Gardens (Hanover) Inc.6 9 where the
court held the receiver liable for an arbitration award which took place prior to
the appointment of the receiver. The court held that the appointment of a
court-appointed receiver fell within the definition of a disposition under the
Ontario Labour Relations Act (OLRA). Interestingly the court held so even
though, in the opinion of the court, the words of the B.C. Act upon which the
Uncle Ben's decision was made were passive, while the words of the Ontario
Act were active: the B.C Act requires the business to be "sold, leased ... or
otherwise disposed of," while the Ontario Act's provisions are triggered only
"where an employer ... sells,"' 70 The court found that the Ontario Act, even with
its active voice, was meant to "cover the situation where an employer who has
conducted his business in such a way that a court has appointed a receiver ...
may be held to have 'disposed' of it for the purposes of the Act."'7 1 The court
held that by virtue of the sale, the receiver was "bound by the collective
agreement as if it had been a party thereto," and was liable to pay the arbitration
award "as part of its administration from the proceeds of the sale" prior to the
claims of the secured and unsecured creditors.72 The court drew no distinction
between what the receiver did with the business, but the reasoning upon which
66. [1979] 2 Can L.R.B.R. 126 (B.C.L.R.B.) cited in J. M. Whyte "Employee Rights in In-
solvencies the Obligations of Trustees and Receivers-an Overview" in Canadian Bar
Association-Ontario 1991 Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Emerging Issues
in Insolvency Law, (Toronto: The Canadian Bar Association, 1991).
67. Whyte, supra, note 66 at 33.
68. Ibid.
69. (1983), 43 O.R.(2d) 754 cited in Whyte, supra, note 66 at 34 [hereinafter Maritime Life
cited to O.R.].
70. Maritime Life, supra, note 69 at 758.
71. Ibid. at 758-9.
72. Ibid.
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it based its judgment would appear to make it applicable regardless of what a
receiver did after taking over the business.
Given the court's reasoning in Maritime Life, it would be open to a court to give
the same interpretation to the ESA, since the language is nearly identical to that
of the OLRA. Thus, if a court followed the above reasoning, it might be possible
to exact payment of owed termination and severance pay from the receiver-man-
ager. Furthermore, the ratio in Maritime Life appears to be broad enough to
apply to a receiver regardless of what the receiver does after taking over the
business. Nevertheless, application of the section would appear to be more
certain where the receiver actually does carry on the business and effectively
becomes an employer by keeping on employees to help it realize the owed debt.
CONCLUSION: LAW REFORM
The simplest solution to the problems caused by Rizzo is to amend the ESA to
cover employees who are terminated as a result of bankruptcy. Such an amend-
ment would be as simple as adding a subsection stating that "for the purposes
of section 57 and 58, a termination by the issuance of a receiving order, or by a
voluntary assignment in bankruptcy shall be a termination by the employer."
Given the apparent worry in the Ministry over this decision, it is not unlikely
that such an amendment will happen. Even if the termination and severance pay
provisions are not altered in such a way, it might be as effective to alter the
provisions Part XIV. 1 dealing with the Employee Wage Protection Program to
extend entitlement to employees who are barred from collecting from the estate
of the bankrupt because of Rizzo. In the interests of fairness, altering the
definition of termination would seem to be the wiser alternative. Since the
money for the Employee Wage Protection Program is paid out of the
government's consolidated revenue fund, it would make more sense to first
allow employees to attempt to collect from the estate which owes them rather
than from the taxpayers of the province. It seems unfair to allow an employer
to socialize liability when it may have the means to satisfy claims.
Simply making employees statutorily entitled to termination and severance pay
will not ensure that they will receive these amounts. Claims for termination and
severance pay are unpreferred, unsecured claims. The low priority which they
are afforded means, in many cases, that the entitlements are not satisfied from
the bankrupt's estate before it is soaked dry by the higher priority creditors.
Since it seems unfair to allow employers to socialize liability for these entitle-
ments, it may make more sense to ensure employees receive these amounts from
the bankrupt's estate or from the owners' (directors') pockets.
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In order to ensure that employees receive termination and severance pay before
other creditors, changes must be made at the Federal level. Originally, the
province could deem an entitlement to be held in trust for an employee. Since
trusts do not form part of the bankrupt's estate, 73 the beneficiary of the trust
effectively gets payment prior to other creditors. The ESA deems vacation pay
to be held in trust for employees whether or not it is treated this way by the
employer.74 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that statuto-
rily deemed trusts are not valid trusts for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. 75
Aside from a statutorily deemed trust, there is no other way the province has of
altering the priority of creditors in the event of bankruptcy. Thus, a change must
be made to the Bankruptcy Act itself in order to give employees' claims for
termination and severance pay some type of priority. This can be accomplished
in one of two ways, depending on the amount of priority which Parliament
wishes to assign them. Since employees already have preferred, unsecured
claims for wages, Parliament may deem wages under this section to include
amounts for termination and severance pay. The other option is for Parliament
to recognize provincially deemed trusts in the Bankruptcy Act for wages (which
would include termination and severance pay) just as it recognizes such trusts
for tax and some pension contribution purposes. Of the two options, the former
seems like the more likely option since it does not vary the existing priority
structure. However, since it still leaves the claims behind those of secured
creditors, it does not do very much to guarantee that the claims will be satisfied
by the bankrupt's estate.
A more drastic (and therefore unlikely) solution would be to impose personal
liability upon directors to satisfy the claims. Although it would most certainly
be unpopular with the business community, the most effective solution would
be to make directors personally liable for termination and severance pay just as
they are so liable for wages. The harshness of such personal liability could be
tempered by imposing a ceiling on the amount of liability as exists for director
liability for wages.
Another helpful legislative reform would be a clarification of the successor
employer provisions of the ESA to indicate whether receivers who carry on a
business are bound by successor employer provisions of the ESA. If receivers
were deemed to be successor employers it certainly puts employees in a superior
position vis a vis other creditors since it would mean that employees would be
73. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, supra, note 25 s. 67.
74. ESA, supra, note 2 s. 15.
75. B.C. v. Henfrey Samson Belair Ltd. (1989), 75 C.B.R.(N.S.) 1 (S.C.C.) cited in Whyte,
supra, at note 66.
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able to receive their entitlements prior to other creditors. Although such a
provision may seem to help employees, it is not without its problems. If a
receiver fears that it may be liable for large termination and severance pay
obligations, it may choose not to continue the business and simply close the
business without the help of any previous employees. Since successor employer
provisions would probably not apply to a receiver who merely takes over and
liquidates the assets of a business, it might be less costly for a receiver not to
run the business if it meant incurring liability for termination and severance
pay.76 Regardless of what the legislature chooses to do, some kind of change
should be made in order to have some certainty on the issue.
Given the Court of Appeal's refusal to adopt a purposive interpretation of the
ESA, it is the job of the legislature to ensure that the termination and severance
pay provisions are changed so it is certain that they apply to bankrupt employers.
Until such a legislative change is made, it is important that employee advocates
try to use all possible strategies to circumvent the harshness of the Rizzo
decision. The strategies most likely to succeed would appear to be claims under
the common law for wrongful dismissal damages, or claims under the ESA in
the case of a voluntary assignment in bankruptcy by the employer.
Ultimately, the Rizzo decision illustrates the relationship that exists between
employment law and insolvency law. It is therefore important that workers'
advocates know of the implications of insolvency on employees' claims as well
as the all of the remedies available to satisfy these claims, particularly consid-
ering the number of bankruptcies which occur in this province in each year, and
the vulnerability of employees in the event of bankruptcy.
76. Whyte, supra, note 66 at 44.
